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Cognitive Film Theory: 
An Insider s Appraisal 
Carl Plantinga 
RÉSUMÉ 
Cet article évalue la contribution de l'approche cogni-
tive aux études cinématographiques et indique les voies 
à emprunter pour que cette approche soit aussi efficace 
et utile que possible. L'auteur montre d'abord que les 
études «cognitivistes» du cinéma ne sont telles qu'au 
sens large du terme et qu'elles pourraient tout aussi 
bien être qualifiées d'« analytiques ». Il fait ensuite 
valoir que l'approche cognitive serait plus utile si elle 
était appliquée de façon plus générale, devenant alors 
davantage un engagement en faveur de la rationalité du 
discours et de la pensée humaine qu'un projet se tenant 
strictement dans les limites de la psychologie. Enfin, il 
démontre l'utilité de l'approche cognitive pour la com-
préhension du pouvoir psychologique du cinéma et de 
l'esthétique du film. 
ABSTRACT 
This article appraises the contributions of what has 
been called cognitivism or the cognitive approach to 
film studies, and suggests the means by which the cog-
nitive approach can become more central to film stud-
ies than it has been so far. The author first shows that 
much of what has been called "cognitivist" film studies 
is only cognitivist in a broad sense, and could just as 
well be called "analytic." He then argues that the cogni-
tive approach would be most useful when it is thus 
broadly applied, becoming then more a commitment 
to the rationality of discourse and human thought than 
a narrow project within psychology. The article then 
goes on to appraise the ut i l i ty of the cognitive 
approach in our understanding of the psychological 
power of film and film aesthetics. 
Having recently returned from the third biennial symposium 
of the Center for Cognitive Studies of the Moving Image,1 I 
write this appraisal of the current state of cognitive film theory 
with enthusiasm. The success of this third symposium, held at 
the University of Pecs in Pecs, Hungary, from May 21-25, 
2001, holds promise that the cognitive approach has a future in 
the interdisciplinary study of film. The cognitive approach has a 
small but growing number of adherents, with strong interna-
tional and interdisciplinary participation. The twenty-five 
speakers at the symposium were psychologists, philosophers, 
film scholars, and graduate students hailing from nine coun-
tries. (Interest in the cognitive approach seems to be stronger in 
Europe than in North America; most of the speakers were 
European.) 
One of the most attractive features of the symposium is the 
congeniality that stems from a sense of common purpose. 
Adherents to the cognitive approach have significant differences; 
the commitment to similar principles of academic discourse, 
however, allows for more productive discussion and debate than 
is sometimes found at academic film conferences. In fact, one 
sign of the health of the symposium is the growing interest of 
scholars who do not call themselves cognitivists (or at least not 
primarily cognitivists) and whose scholarship centres on other 
approaches. 
To begin I'd like to characterise the cognitive approach in two 
ways, historically and conceptually, and to assess the strengths 
and successes of the approach. Next I'll turn to problematic 
issues and the weaknesses of the approach. I'll end the essay 
with an assessment of the future of "cognitive film theory," 
whatever this phrase may come to mean. 
A Brief History of the Cognitive Approach 
The cognitive approach was introduced in the mid- to late-
1980s with a series of books and essays that began to make a 
decisive difference in how scholars think about the study of 
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film. Nineteen eighty-five marked the appearance of David 
Bordwell's Narration in the Fiction Film and Bordwell, Janet 
Staiger, and Kristin Thompson's The Classical Hollywood 
Cinema: Film Style and Mode of Production to 1960. These books 
make a powerful case for the study of film form and spectator 
psychology based on the kinds of mental activities described by 
cognitive psychology. Bordwell further clarified this methodolo-
gy in his 1989 "A Case for Cognitivism" and the 1990 "A Case 
for Cognitivism: Further Reflections." 
While Bordwell was developing a new method for film study, 
Noël Carroll was busy discrediting the conventional methodolo-
gies. Carroll dropped a "bombshell" on the discipline of film 
studies, first with a spirited attack on the psycho-semiotic film 
theory of Stephen Heath in the journal October, and then a few 
years later with his 1988 Mystifying Movies: Fads and Fallacies in 
Contemporary Film Theory. Mystifying Movies critiqued the then-
reigning paradigm of film theory, a combination of Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, Althusserian Marxism, and Barthesian semiotics. 
After systematically arguing against the main tenets of this 
Theory, Carroll's conclusion was characteristically uncompro-
mising. Such theory, he writes, has "[...] impeded research and 
reduced film analysis to the repetition of fashionable slogans 
and unexamined assumptions" (Carroll, 1988, p. 234). He 
argued that it must be completely discarded and we must begin 
anew. Carroll squarely challenged the legitimacy of film theory 
as it was being practised in the 1970s and 1980s, and in a way 
that made it difficult for film theorists to ignore. 
Bordwell and Carroll continued the assault with their collec-
tion of essays, the 1996 Post-Theory: Reconstructing Film Studies. 
The frontispiece of the paperback edition of this book caused 
some resentment, as its photograph of schoolboys Laurel and 
Hardy, standing confused before a blackboard covered with mis-
spelled words and bad arithmetic, could be seen as a visual 
metaphor for bad theory and confused theorists. Yet the polyva-
lence of the cover image suggests more; one could also see the 
Laurel and Hardy characters as Bordwell and Carroll attempting 
to make sense of arcane academic systems. On either interpreta-
tion, however, this book is clearly designed to mark a decisive 
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intervention in the field, and not necessarily to preserve diplo-
matic relationships with the psycho-semioticians whom it cri-
tiques.2 
It could be argued that Bordwell and Carroll's polemics were 
necessary interventions in a field that had become locked into 
an orthodox theory that many found to be unacceptable. The 
outcome has not been a Kuhnian-style paradigm shift; there has 
been no academic revolution. Cognitive theory has had influ-
ence, but it is still practised by a minority of film scholars, if not 
exactly on the margins of film studies, then certainly not in the 
mainstream either. Yet Carroll and Bordwell's polemics cracked 
the film theory shell, and thus served film studies well. "Psycho-
semiotic" theory is on the wane, and the field has become more 
diverse and open to varied sorts of approaches. Many cogni-
tivists hope that the polemical interventions are behind us, and 
that we can begin to concentrate on the positive contributions 
the cognitive approach has to offer the study of film. Indeed, 
Post-Theory, although it critiques the reigning paradigm, pri-
marily consists of positive scholarship, demonstrations of the 
cognitive approach in relation to theoretical, aesthetic, psycho-
logical, and historical topics in film. Positive scholarship must 
be the focus of future efforts by cognitive theorists. 
Although Bordwell and Carroll have been the most impor-
tant figures in promoting the cognitive approach, the work of 
many other scholars has made significant contributions. The 
theories of Hugo Munsterberg, Sergei Eisenstein, and other 
early film theorists initiated the study of the psychology of film 
from a broadly cognitive perspective. There is a long tradition of 
thinking about the psychological effects and processes of film 
viewing from perspectives other than psychoanalysis.3 
Joseph and Barbara Anderson are two of the earliest and most 
consistent proponents of cognitive film theory in its current 
manifestation.4 Joseph Anderson heads the Center for the 
Cognitive Study of the Moving Image, and oversees the regular 
symposia of the centre, while Barbara Anderson contributes in 
many ways, not least by offering excellent symposia papers on 
various topics in cognitive theory. Joseph Anderson's (1996) rel-
atively recent book, The Reality of Illusion: An Ecological 
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Approach to Cognitive Film Theory, is a valuable resource for 
anyone wishing an introduction to the cognitive approach, 
albeit from an "ecological" perspective (as I will discuss below). 
Other books from a broadly cognitive perspective have recently 
examined classical narrative technique (Thompson, 1999), nar-
rative comprehension (Branigan, 1992), non-fiction film 
(Plantinga, 1999), character engagement (Smith, 1995), the 
avant-garde (Peterson, 1997), film and spectator psychology 
(Currie, 1995; Persson, 2001), and, in two collections of essays, 
a broad spectrum of film-related issues (Allen and Smith, 1997; 
Carroll, 1996). 
For some time it was thought that a weakness of the cognitive 
approach was its inability to deal with the elicitation of emotion 
in film. The cognitive approach to the emotions, however, has 
been central in philosophy, psychology, and other major disci-
plines for twenty years, and recent publications have brought 
such methodology to bear on film (Grodal, 1997; Plantinga and 
Smith, 1999; Tan, 1996). Warren Buckland's The Cognitive 
Semiotics of Film (2000) argues for a "European" mode of cogni-
tive film theory differing from the theory so far described in its 
reliance on linguistics and semiotics. In his book Buckland 
details the contributions of Michel Colin, Francesco Casetti, 
Christian Metz, Roger Odin, Dominique Chateau, and others. 
Within the discipline of film studies, the presence of cogni-
tive theory is becoming increasingly visible. The work of cogni-
tivists has been published in prominent anthologies, and the 
approach is a more consistent presence in conversations among 
film scholars. There is still much opposition, as Greg Currie 
writes, "[...] for a supposed adherence to positivism and hence 
for a betrayal of the new, radical insights of those approaches to 
film that have emerged in the wake of structuralism" (Currie, 
1999a, p. 105). And indeed, this refusal to "see the light" causes 
some to dismiss cognitive theory as naïve or politically retro-
grade. In his summary and critique of cognitivism, for example, 
Robert Stam (2000, p. 240) writes that cognitive theory 
[...] can be viewed as a nostalgic move backward to a 
world prior to Saussurean differentialism, prior to the 
Frankfurt School indictment of "instrumental reason," 
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prior to Lacan's destabilized ego, prior to Marxist and 
Freudian critiques of "common sense," prior to 
Foucault's power-knowledge nexus and the mutually 
constitutive relation between reason and madness . 
In looking over this list of theorists, however, one wonders 
just who is being nostalgic. Cognitive film theory draws from 
some of the most recent interdisciplinary methodologies. On 
the other hand, while Freud and Saussure are certainly useful, 
they are hardly the latest thing.5 
Hard feelings stemming from Bordwell and Carroll's original 
polemical attacks continue to dog cognitivists. Indeed, it has 
been the response of some in the field to wholly ignore them, 
seemingly hoping that they will just go away. As Stam (2000, 
p. 235) remarks of Post-Theory, the targets of Bordwell and 
Carroll's provocations "[...] reacted with olympian hauteur, 
rarely deigning to respond". Moreover, the ad hominem attacks 
on Bordwell and Carroll are not difficult to hear and read at 
conferences and in the pages of major film journals. One can 
only hope that the discussion will continue to turn away from 
personalities to the discussion and debate of ideas. 
What Defines Cognitive Film Theory? 
Excellent summaries of the cognitive approach exist elsewhere 
(Bordwell, 1989a and 1990; Brooks, 1984; Currie, 1999a), so 
in this section I will be brief. At the broadest level, cognitive 
theorists are committed to clarity of exposition and argument 
and to the relevance of empirical evidence and the standards of 
science (where appropriate). It would be a mistake to claim that 
cognitive theorists oppose psychoanalysis per se, although most 
would agree that psychoanalysis as practised in film studies has 
not been fruitful. Moreover, psychoanalysis seems ill-suited to 
account for normative behavior such as perception, narrative 
comprehension, social cognition, and the experience of garden-
variety emotions such as fear and pity. 
Beyond such broad generalities, we can speak only of tenden-
cies, for the kinds of methodologies and intellectual commit-
ments that fall under the rubric "cognitive theory" are broad 
indeed. In part this stems from the elusiveness of the term "cog-
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nitive theory," and hence, "cognitive film theory." To restrict 
cognitive film theory to theory rooted in cognitive science 
would clearly be far too narrow, and also plainly inaccurate.6 
Traditionally, cognitive science has searched for the processes 
underlying intelligent problem solving, or information process-
ing, using the computer as a metaphor for the human mind.7 
And although cognitivists have mostly left the computer analo-
gy behind, they have approached certain elements of narrative 
comprehension and perception using models of rationality and 
practical problem-solving. When Bordwell writes of the 
schémas, inferences, hypotheses, and assumptions used in film 
viewing, he assumes a spectator engaging in goal-directed, pri-
marily non-conscious procedures to make sense of film narra-
tives. 
Yet in the work of other cognitivists, one sees strains that 
emerge from outside of cognitive science proper. Joseph An-
derson's The Reality of Illusion, for example, is typical of much 
cognitive theory in its hybrid methodology, melting a combina-
tion of cognitive theory strictly defined, an ecological approach 
derived from J. J. Gibson, and evolutionary psychology. 
Furthermore, although cognitivists are obviously interested in 
cognition in relation to the film spectator, some have begun to 
take a strong interest in neuroscience and its relation to specta-
tor psychology. When reading Torben Grodal's Moving Pictures 
(1997), for example, one finds many references to the physical 
processes of the embodied brain in relation to cognitive process-
es. The cognitive philosophers, on the other hand, are less inter-
ested in neuropsychology than in rational thought processes and 
logical argument. Noël Carroll's The Philosophy of Horror 
(1990), for example, theorises the phenomenon of horror in 
purely cognitive and rationalistic terms. 
I could go on to enumerate similar examples. The point is 
that "cognitive film theory" does not necessarily imply a com-
mitment to cognitive science, strictly defined, and certainly not 
to cognitive science exclusively. One might say that cognitive 
film theorists tend to be committed to the study of human psy-
chology using the methods of contemporary psychology and 
analytic philosophy. This can be an amalgam of cognitive, evo-
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lutionary, empirical, and/or ecological psychology, with perhaps 
a bit of neuroscience and dynamical systems theory thrown in 
the mix. 
Cognitive film theorists not only differ in methodology, but 
also in fundamental beliefs about human psychology, or, as in 
the following example, psychology in relation to ontology. To 
take one case, David Bordwells brand of theory is constructivist 
in its assumption that perceptual and cognitive activity goes 
beyond the information given. As Bordwell writes (1989a, 
p. 18), perception "[...] is not a passive recording of sensory 
stimulation; the sensory input is filtered, transformed, filled in, 
and compared with other inputs to build, inferentially, a consis-
tent, stable world". For Bordwell, the spectator constructs the 
fabula, or story, of the fiction film in the process of viewing. 
The degree to which that constructed fabula is consistent from 
viewer to viewer depends on what kind of processes are used to 
construct it. Bordwell (1989a, p. 22) distinguishes between neu-
rological processes, universal cognitive processes, and culturally 
variable cognitive processes. 
Gregory Currie, from a realist perspective, questions this con-
structivism, asking what advantage it provides to say that the 
meaning of a work is constructed rather than discovered by the 
viewer. Currie takes Bordwell's motivation to be to posit an 
active rather than passive spectator, in part to counter psychoan-
alytic assumptions about the passive spectator of the classical 
text. Currie claims that this is a poor motivation. It does not 
take constructivism to find an active spectator; isn't the discov-
ery of the text s meaning, he asks, also an active response? Currie 
notes that Bordwell cannot be a realist with regard to narrative 
meaning, since Bordwell must posit that such meaning is con-
structed and not there, in the film, to be discovered. Bordwell is 
a constructivist in this regard, but a realist in another sense, 
"[...] on the important issue of the existence and significance of 
connections between the narrative and the real world" (Currie, 
1999a, p. 113).8 Most cognitivists, including Bordwell and 
Currie, tend to favour naturalistic explanations of filmic phe-
nomena that assume that we make sense of films in many of the 
same ways we make sense of the real world. 
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All of this is to reiterate a claim often made before; cogni-
tivists have developed an approach rather than a well-defined 
theory. What defines the approach is a commitment to clarity of 
discourse, vigorous debate, and a loose family of assumptions 
about workable means to study film and film spectatorship. 
Chief among these assumptions is Bordwell and Carroll's call for 
"piecemeal" theory, an emphasis on middle-level research that 
chooses small, manageable questions for investigation. Bordwell 
bemoans the tendency in film studies to "[...] exude a sweeping 
confidence that we are on the verge of the next Big Theory of 
Everything," and he denies that cognitivism is such a theory. He 
ends his essay about cognitivism with a proviso: "All this could 
turn out to be wrongheaded and useless" (Bordwell, 1989a, 
p. 33). Cognitivism may eventually be superceded by or melded 
with another, more sophisticated psychological theory. Most 
theories are superceded. As Bordwell (1989a, p. 33) writes, we 
can only hope that it will have been "[...] a little bit right and 
somewhat useful here and there". 
The cognitive approach is committed to middle-level research 
about film and film spectatorship, with an appreciation for 
"bottom-up theory" that is sometimes denigrated in other areas 
of film theory. Of course, this is not to deny that some cogni-
tivists bear a fervor for large scale commitments or make broad 
foundational assumptions. It is more to say that some middle-
level research can be conducted independent of those assump-
tions, and can be of use to scholars from diverse perspectives.9 
What Has Cognitive Film Theory Accomplished? 
Cognitive film theory, broadly considered, has made signifi-
cant contributions to the study of film. Here I will mention 
only those contributions with which I am most familiar, and 
apologize in advance to those to whom I give short shrift. 
Cognitive theory today is primarily interested in how spectators 
make sense of and respond to films, together with the textual 
structures and techniques that give rise to spectatorial activity 
and response. The most sustained contributions thus far have 
been made by David Bordwell and Noël Carroll. David 
Bordwell's work includes theoretical treatises on filmic narration 
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(Bordwell, 1985) and film interpretation (Bordwell, 1989b), in 
addition to several excellent director studies. From the stand-
point of cognitive theory, Bordwell has established a construc-
tivist approach (as detailed above) and has developed an attrac-
tive and compelling theory of filmic narration. Bordwell's 
theory of narration is useful, for example, in distinguishing 
between classical Hollywood cinema and art cinema, and in 
describing the mental activities of the film spectator.10 
Bordwell's approach is to pay close attention to the formal 
workings of films in relation to the theory of narration he has 
developed. His work is unsurpassed in the application of a par-
ticular methodology to film style (Bordwell, 1998b), or to the 
study of various film directors and films, as in his studies of 
Eisenstein (Bordwell, 1993), Ozu (Bordwell, 1988), and Hong 
Kong cinema (Bordwell, 2000). 
Noël Carroll's work also is wide-ranging, having touched on 
almost every major topic in the theory of film. In my opinion, 
some of his best work deals with the psychology of film specta-
torship, and can be found in several essays in Theorizing the 
Moving Image (1996). Like Bordwell, Carroll has been interest-
ed in filmic perception and narrative comprehension, but 
Carroll's interest extends to the spectator's motivations and 
emotions, and to what makes the movies such a widespread and 
intense experience for people worldwide (Carroll, 1996, p. 78-
93). Carroll has written on the relationship between genre and 
emotion (in Plantinga and Smith, 1999, p. 21-47), on horror 
(Carroll, 1990), suspense (Carroll, 1996, p. 94-117), and the 
relationship between point-of-view editing and emotion 
(Carroll, 1996, p. 125-138). 
The study of the means by which films elicit emotion has 
become a major area of interest in cognitive film theory of late. 
Books by Grodal, Tan, Plantinga and Smith, Currie, and Carroll 
have all shown that the cognitive approach has much to tell 
about how films elicit emotion. Their basic assumption is that 
emotions have reasons. In other words, our emotional response 
to texts (and other phenomena) is dependent in part on how we 
evaluate and assimilate textual information. Thus the rhetoric of 
a text is not simply about ideas, but also about emotional 
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responses. Cognitive film theory argues that in responding to 
films, thinking and feeling are intimately related. 
Character identification, or what Murray Smith prefers to call 
character "engagement," is one of the dominant means by 
which we become involved in a film emotionally. Smith argues 
that one primary mode of engagement, what he calls the struc-
ture of sympathy, is a process that has three components: 
1) recognition, by which the spectator constructs the character; 
2) alignment, by which spectators are placed in relation to char-
acters both visually and epistemically; and 3) allegiance, by 
which spectators morally evaluate characters. Smith's theory is 
elegant, intuitively plausible, and useful in gauging the rhetori-
cal and aesthetic functions of individual films, as his film analy-
ses show. These are ideas, I believe, that will have a long life in 
the study of film in relation to spectator response. (At the 2001 
Symposium mentioned above, Jonathan Frome delivered an 
excellent paper, entitled "Revisiting Identification," in which he 
extended and critiqued Smiths theory of character engagement.) 
Character engagement is one of the ways that the text primes 
the emotional response of the viewer. If an emotion results in 
part from an evaluation of a situation, our assessment of the 
meaning of a situation for a favoured character will become a 
major part of that evaluation. Emotional response also depends 
on the nature of the situation presented, however, and on the 
way the situation unfolds. In this way, particular sorts of narra-
tive scenarios are associated with specific emotions—the family 
melodrama with sentiment, action/adventure with suspense and 
excitement, the romantic comedy with amusement and senti-
ment, etc. The relationship between narrative and emotion has 
been the subject of a recent flurry of publications, but it is 
nonetheless at a preliminary stage. One daunting question is the 
degree to which film-elicited emotions are similar and dissimilar 
to garden-variety emotions we experience in our actual, extra-
filmic lives. We also need a better understanding of the specifici-
ty of the film medium in the evocation of emotion. Some stud-
ies have attempted to come to grips with certain elements of this 
specificity, considering the use of point of view editing (Carroll, 
1996), the represented human face (Plantinga, 1999), "align -
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ment" (M. Smith, 1995), and film music (J. Smith, 1999) in 
relation to emotion. Much remains to be done, obviously. 
In the study of the non-fiction film, cognitive theorists have 
made a substantial contribution as well. Both traditional and 
post-structuralist critics tended to take the non-fiction film as a 
kind of imitation or reconstruction of reality. Such a view cre-
ates problems for the very notion of documentary, because one 
can easily find the techniques by which documentaries manipu-
late their materials (and thus "the real"). This leaves open the 
charge that the fiction/non-fiction distinction is illicit, that doc-
umentaries make use of fictional techniques, and even that doc-
umentaries are duplicitous in their pretence to deliver a pristine 
reality when in fact they are manipulated and rhetorically pur-
poseful. This way of thinking defines the documentary in such a 
way that no film could possibly meet its requirements, then cas-
tigates documentaries for pretending to do so! 
These confusions stem from the faulty notion that a non-fic-
tion film pretends to be or is taken as a perfect rendition or 
copy of some pro-filmic event or real-world subject. Instead, I 
have argued that it makes more sense to think of a non-fiction 
film in light of action theory, a broad derivation of speech act 
theory (Plantinga, 1987). Non-fiction films are those films 
through which the filmmaker(s) assert, and about which the 
spectator assumes, that "[...] given objects, entities, states of 
affairs, events, or situations actually occur(red) or exist(ed) in 
the actual world as portrayed" (Plantinga, 1997, p. 18). This 
suggestion has been subsequently revised, refined, and critiqued 
(Carroll, 1997; Currie, 1999b; Ponech, 1999). 
The distinction between fiction and non-fiction, then, stems 
not from any necessary textual differences between fictional and 
non-fictional films, but from the use to which the text is put 
within a world of discursive action. Non-fiction films, like gov-
ernments, money, and birth certificates, function the way they 
do because we assign them a certain status, and because that sta-
tus is taken up by a broader community and acted upon. To put 
it baldly and much too simply, prototypical non-fictions are used 
to provide direct information and/or arguments, and prototypi-
cal fictions to present imaginary worlds and stories. The tech-
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niques used for these separate functions will often be similar for 
fiction and non-fiction films, and it is not the case, for example, 
that continuity editing or the use of non-diegetic music is a fic-
tional rather than a non-fictional technique. They are film tech-
niques that can be used in both fiction and non-fiction films. 
The spectator, then, may well use similar, though not identi-
cal, strategies of perception, comprehension, and interpretation 
when viewing fiction and non-fiction films. We can nonetheless 
distinguish the prototypes based on instrumental factors such as 
the intended and actual functions of the films within the world 
of human discourse. This is the level at which the distinction 
between fiction and non-fiction runs the deepest. 
What Must Cognitive Film Theory Do Better? 
Since the cognitive approach to film theory is a recent phe-
nomenon, it is unsurprising that much more needs to be done, 
both in extending the kinds of work already accomplished and in 
branching into new directions. There is certainly no area of film 
scholarship that is closed, no question that has been fully 
answered and explored. But is cognitive theory on the right track? 
The film studies establishment has critiqued cognitivism for its 
alleged commitment to science and objectivity and its seeming 
lack of concern for the cultural issues that currently occupy film 
studies. With regard to the use of scientific method, evidence, 
and/or logical reasoning, cognitivists must plead guilty as charged. 
Most of us find the methods of science, logical reasoning, clarity 
of discourse, and/or the appeal to evidence to be central to what 
we do. But this by no means implies positivism, empiricism, 
reductionism, or, to put it baldly, epistemic arrogance. All meth-
ods of human inquiry are fallible. We must simply work with the 
best methods available to us, always ready to revise our conclu-
sions in light of new evidence. Moreover, there may be some 
questions for which humanistic inquiry of another kind is still the 
best approach. For many questions, however, broadly "scientific" 
or analytic methodologies are the best means of investigation. 
Robert Stam (2000, p. 240-241) writes of the cognitive theo-
rists "[...] touching faith in reason (after Auschwitz) and sci-
ence (after Hiroshima)." 
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Cognitivism, he writes, keeps its faith with science, 
even though "science" had not so recently "proved" 
black, Jewish, and Native American inferiority. The 
question, of course, is to what end is science being 
used, and who gets to decide. 
Stam's points here are confused. Surely reason and science 
enabled the scale of the killing at Auschwitz and Hiroshima. 
They aren't the root cause of such killing, however. Is the fact 
that science has been used to such ends reason enough to aban-
don science? Surely reason and science have been used to pro-
mote the inferiority of races and ethnicities. But reason and sci-
ence aren't the root causes of such racism and oppression. And 
science never proved Jewish or black inferiority, although some 
scientists may have attempted to do so. 
If Stam's claim is that reason and science are tools that can 
be used for good or for ill, then he is surely right. I know of 
no cognitive theorist who blindly embraces all scientific pro-
jects or findings, or who denies that science can be used in 
atrocious ways. Cognitive theorists believe that the tools of sci-
ence are useful for the study of certain middle-range problems 
having to do with film and the psychology of spectatorship. 
Instead of castigating cognitive theorists for a broad "faith in 
science and reason," a more useful critique of cognitivism 
would either show how appeals to evidence and argument fail 
generally, or demonstrate that cognitivists use these tools in 
irresponsible or politically retrograde ways. I have not seen 
such a critique. 
This leads to the second issue, the claim that cognitive film 
theory is uninterested in "alterity" and the cultural and political 
concerns thought normative in much of film studies—gender 
and gender roles, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, etc. While 
cognitive theorists have dealt with issues such as gender (e.g., 
Carroll, 1996, p. 260-274; Freeland, 1996; Leibowitz, 1996), 
the heart of cognitive theory lies outside of the cultural concerns 
of mainstream film studies. This in itself might be of little con-
cern, since film theory has shown itself to be fickle, and the idea 
that some scholars might take an interest in questions other 
than those du jour is hardly alarming. 
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Yet at the same time, many cognitive theorists are sympathet-
ic to the general political bent of the film studies discipline, that 
is, to gender and racial equality, to multiculturalism, and to the 
promotion of equality and tolerance for ethnic and sexual 
minorities. Some film scholars, unfortunately, seem to think 
that cognitivists whose work doesn't directly touch on these 
issues are somehow ideologically suspect. I don't know what can 
be done about such blinkered thinking (let alone the conformist 
assumption that all in film studies must share a particular politi-
cal project). 
On the other hand, however, since many cognitivists are 
committed to the field s political concerns, perhaps it is time to 
produce scholarship that demonstrates the usefulness of cogni-
tive film theory in answering the questions pertinent to the poli-
tics of location. One of the chief roadblocks here is that cultural 
theorists are currently enamored of "difference" while the cogni-
tive theorists appeal to universalistic or naturalistic explanations 
for spectator behaviour. For many film theorists, "difference" is 
a key concept—in fact, a foundational idea in the determination 
of how spectators respond to films. Feminist film theory, one of 
the major strains of film theory today, depends wholly on the 
idea that spectatorship is gendered, and that films elicit gen-
dered responses. Cultural studies approaches emphasise the idio-
syncrasies of particular historical communities in responses to 
film, and downplay any sense of a spectator with universal char-
acteristics. For such theorists, the cognitivist appeal to human 
nature runs against the grain. Again to quote Stam (2000, 
p. 241), cognitive theory 
[...] allows little room for the politics of location, or 
for the socially shaped investments, ideologies, narcis-
sisms, and desires of the spectator, all of which seem 
too irrational and messy for the theory to deal with. 
In defence of cognitivism, one must first note that neither 
appeals to human difference nor to human similarities have an 
inherent political perspective. Film theorists typically assume 
that claims for human nature are politically dangerous, since 
they establish normative behavior against which alternatives 
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may be found to be perverse or inferior. Yet appeals to differ-
ences between races or genders have long been a favourite tool 
of the oppressor, and claims for the essential equality of all 
humans have been instrumental in campaigns for emancipa-
tion.11 In fact, cultural theorists cannot escape various universal-
ist assumptions, such as assumptions about the equal worth of 
all races, genders, and ethnicities, the immorality of oppression, 
etc. The cognitivist search for far-reaching naturalistic explana-
tions of human behaviour, then, is not necessarily a political 
handicap, any more than an emphasis on difference necessarily 
favours tolerance. 
Second, it is obvious that humans share basic characteristics 
that have far-reaching effects on our behaviour. Some of these 
more or less universal characteristics directly relate to the film 
viewing experience. This assumption constitutes a fundamental 
strength of cognitive film theory, its examination of what 
Bordwell calls "contingent universals,"(Bordwell and Carroll, 
1996, p. 91-92)12 similarities between spectators, ordinary states 
of mind (rather than the pathological states of interest to the 
psychoanalyst), and the everyday abilities and characteristics 
that allow us to make sense of and respond to movies and the 
world. 
Perhaps some would say that such claims are true but funda-
mentally uninteresting or unproductive. Stam (quoted in Quart, 
2000, p. 41) has remarked, for example, "[Film] Cognitivists say 
that all viewers have the same perceptual apparatus. That's like 
saying we all defecate. So what?" Of course, using similar 
rhetoric, one could also easily caricature and belittle the claims 
for difference and heterogeneity. To claim that the only elements 
worth investigating are those that differentiate us seems rather 
narrow, as though everybody already knows our commonalities. If 
our commonalities are so well known and understood, then of 
course there is no further need for research into human emo-
tion, perception, cognition, medical science, etc. This is implau-
sible. To understand spectatorship, one must understand what 
spectators share in common, and those commonalities are often 
not matters of common knowledge. The proper method to 
explore spectatorship, it seems to me, is to investigate the "con-
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tingent universals" of spectatorship, the similarities across vari-
ous social groups (gender, culture, nation, etc.), and the means 
by which "the politics of location" and numerous other factors 
inflect these characteristics. 
Cognitive theory should provide useful tools for the study of 
the politics of location, or if you will, alterity. Given that we 
begin with contingent universals, the addition of the influences 
of location—historical contingencies, ethnicity, race, gender, 
sexual orientation, etc.—typically result in variations in social 
cognition. As Bordwell (1989a) reports, the cognitivist frame-
work has influenced a broad array of disciplines, including 
sociology, anthropology, and history. Working within such a 
framework leads the researcher to show how social action is 
mediated by mental representations, and how such mental rep-
resentations—schemata, scripts, mental models—organise cul-
tural life. In fact, sophisticated new approaches in sociology 
and social cognition are available to be exploited by those ana-
lyzing film.13 
Understanding how a movie plays differently in the suburbs 
versus the inner city, or in Dallas versus Paris or Sao Paulo, for 
example, would involve a cultural analysis of the mental models 
under use by the audience. Is it true that Germans and 
Americans tend to respond differently to sentimental films, and 
if so, what is the difference? Does the interactive nature of the 
film viewing experience in some cultures influence emotional 
response? How does political opposition to a films ideological 
"project" influence emotional response? Researchers have shown 
that certain genres appeal predominantly to men and others to 
women. What social schémas or scripts are at work to determine 
such likes and dislikes? Why are certain films popular in some 
countries and not in others? How is cross-cultural emotional 
response to films influenced by varied emotion scenarios or 
scripts in the culture at large? And is the globalisation of the 
media working to homogenise the emotional lives of diverse 
populations? The tools of the cognitivist could be useful in 
helping to answer all of these questions. 
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Prospects for the Future 
As I wrote at this essay's start, those who attended the third 
symposium of the Center for Cognitive Studies of the Moving 
Image left excited about the future of the organisation and the 
cognitive approach it represents. As the semi-official institution 
behind cognitive film theory, the centre, headed by Joseph 
Anderson at Georgia State University in Atlanta, has an impor-
tant role to play in disseminating information, maintaining 
esprit de corps, and organising regular conferences. The organisa-
tion's board of directors, at their post-symposium meeting, 
sensed a good deal of enthusiasm and momentum among those 
who attended. They concluded that it was time to take steps to 
expand the activities of the centre. These steps will include a 
move towards an annual conference, the establishment of a ref-
ereed on-line journal to be called The Journal of the Moving 
Image, and an expansion of the centre's website to feature links 
to salient essays and e-books (see endnote #1 for the website 
address). 
Cognitive film theorists have no ambition to make cognitive 
theory the dominant research mode in the field. Were this with-
in the realm of possibility, it could never be a goal. Most cogni-
tivists now are more committed to a broad research program 
than to any particular theory, narrowly considered. Ideally, the 
opportunities for vigorous academic debate and friendly dispu-
tation will remain both within the pages of the new journal and 
at future symposia. Not all film-related questions can be 
answered using the cognitive approach. Nonetheless, I remain 
firmly convinced that the approach has been effective in its 
investigation of certain problems. Its popularity within the dis-
cipline of film studies is limited, but it elicits interdisciplinary 
interest. And the quality and innovation of the work that cogni-
tivists continue to produce promises good things for the 
future.14 
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NOTES 
1. Those wishing further information on the CCSMI should visit its website at 
http://www.gsu.edu/^wwwcsm/. Both Laszlo Tarnay at the University of Pecs, and 
Joseph Anderson, director of CCSMI, were instrumental in planning and coordinat-
ing this symposium. 
2. Two books that generally summarize and stand for what Post-Theory is aimed 
against are Reinventing Film Studies (Gledhill and Williams, 2000) and New 
Vocabularies in Film Semiotics: Structuralism, Post-Structuralism, and Beyond (Stam, 
Burgoyne and Flitterman-Lewis, 1992). 
3. See Allan Langdale (2002). See Langdale's introduction to the volume for the 
implications of Munsterberg's work for cognitive studies. Also see The Film Form 
(Eisenstein, 1977) and The Film Sense (Eisenstein, 1974). 
4. See "The Myth of Persistence of Vision" (Anderson and Fisher, 1978). Also see 
"The Myth of Persistence of Vision Revisited" (Anderson and Anderson, 1993). 
5. For a review of Stam's book and a comment on his treatment of Murray Smith's 
ideas and cognitive film theory, see "Review Article: Theory Misadventure and 
Critical Choices" (Williams, 2001). 
6. A fine overview of cognitive science can be found in The MIT Encyclopedia of the 
Cognitive Sciences (Wilson and Keil, 1999). For an overview of cognitive science and 
the arts, see Cynthia Freeland's two-part essay "Teaching Cognitive Science and the 
Arts" (Freeland 2001a and 2001b), published by the American Society for Aesthetics, 
and available online at <aesthetics-online.org>. 
7. The mind-as-computer metaphor does not sit comfortably with many contem-
porary cognitive theorists, and especially with a growing number of those who fore-
ground the importance of the body in everyday cognition. One strain of cognitive 
theory that emphasises the body stems from George Lakoff and Mark Johnson. See 
their Philosophy and the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western 
Thought (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999). 
8. Bordwell's constructivist approach to cognitive film theory has been critiqued 
and measured against other types of constructivism by Berys Gaut (1995). 
9. Besides an emphasis on "middle-level" theory, cognitive theorists have also called 
for rigorous intellectual debate. Whether this might constitute a genuine pluralism 
has been an issue of some contention. For a bracing debate (that was cut short 
because Cinema Journal refused to print Bordwell's final rejoinder) see "Pluralism ver-
sus the Correct Position" (Lehman, 1997); "Pluralism, Truth, and Scholarly Inquiry 
in Film Studies" (Bordwell, 1998); "Reply to David Bordwell" (Lehman, 1998); "A 
Response to Peter Lehman's Essay 'Pluralism versus the Correct Position'" (Minnis, 
1998); "Reply to Stuart Minnis" (Lehman, 1998). 
10. Bordwell's work on art cinema in Narration in the Fiction Film could profitably 
be compared with his earlier "The Art Cinema as Mode of Film Practice" (Bordwell, 
1979); with Torben Grodal's intriguing cognitive account in "Art Film, the Transient 
Body, and the Permanent Soul" (Grodal, 2000); and with standard non-cognitive 
approaches such as that found in Geoffrey Nowell-Smith's (1996) "Art Cinema." 
11. Although this is perhaps too obvious to be stated, the institution of slavery in 
the United States was grounded in the differentiation between Whites and Blacks, 
and of course, patriarchal gender roles depend fundamentally on presumed differ-
ences between females and males. 
12. For general discussions of the issue of human universals, see Human Universals 
(Brown, 1991); also see "Tradition and Modernity Revisited" (Horton, 1982). 
13. The following are some of the books bearing on social issues from a cognitive 
standpoint: Social Cognition: Making Sense of People (Kunda, 1999); Social Cognition 
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(Fiske and Taylor, 1991); Cultural Transactions: Nature, Self, Society (Hernadi, 1995); 
Moral Imagination: Implications of Cognitive Science for Ethics (Johnson, 1993). 
14. I would like to thank the anonymous reviewer for CiNeMAS for helpful sugges-
tions regarding this essay. 
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